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1 A quick answer to the question posed by the title 
is that they may be. Since the prevailing consensus - I 
think it is fair to say - regards persons not to be members 
of a natural kind, a longer answer is required. Sketching an 
outline of how that answer might proceed  is the purpose 
of the present paper. 
Members of natural kinds, e.g. quarks, electrons, 
gold molecules, viruses, human beings etc., form natural 
divisions in the fabric of the universe. I shall ignore the 
voices that might be raised at this point against the notion 
of natural kinds or for, at most, a few basic natural kinds, 
e.g. quarks and electrons. Rather I shall address the more 
prevalent view that the concept of a person does not 
represent a natural division in the fabric of the universe. If 
that view turns out to be wrong then the austere view will 
have a ready response. 
The consensual position I am interested in finds 
clear expression in the work of Colin McGinn: 
I have been speaking of terms for mental states 
and types of event, but parallel considerations apply to 
psychological sortal predicates, i.e., ‘person’ and 
restrictions thereof. In fact, what we already have implies 
that persons do not comprise a natural kind. For (as I take 
it) a person is precisely an individual sufficiently richly 
endowed with mental traits, and if these do not qualify as 
natural kinds, nor can persons. Persons have no real 
essence; their essence is nominal, and analytically 
defined. In this respect, the concept of a person does not 
coincide with that of a human being, though they may be 
de facto co-extensive: for, by contrast with persons, to 
qualify as a human being an individual must instantiate the 
appropriate empirical real essence – genetic structure, 
evolutionary origin, and the like. The relation between 
personhood and humanity is a contingent one, analogous 
to realization; and the contrasts so far remarked seem to 
hold equally of persons. God did not have to make persons 
out of human beings nor beliefs from patterns of synaptic 
connexions; but he had no choice in the making of human 
beings and heat and lightning. (McGinn 1991:135-6.) 
The following simple argument can be extracted 
from this passage (I have framed it in terms of concepts; of 
course, if the argument is sound, their ontology would 
come under scrutiny): 
P1. Mental concepts do not represent 
(members of) natural kinds. 
P2. The concept of a person is a complex of 
mental concepts. 
Therefore, 
C3. The concept of a person does not 
represent (members of) a natural kind. 
To turn this into an argument for the position that 
persons are members of a natural kind P1 requires 
rebuttal. I do not seek to accomplish that task here, merely 
to show what it would require. In fact I think that such a 
rebuttal can only arise in the light of a future cognitive 
science. This view is reached in the next section after 
setting out the stalls belonging to either side in the debate. 
P2 is then discussed in more detail. Since the view that 
persons are not members of a natural kind arguably 
underpins the more traditional debate stemming from 
Locke on the individuation of persons in terms of 
psychological connectedness, the balance of the paper 
makes the connection between the possible rejection of C3 
and our view of the personal identity issue. 
 
2 Why should mental terms (‘believing’, ‘desiring’, 
‘perceiving’ etc.) not be construed as expressing concepts 
of natural kinds? According to McGinn, in order for mental 
terms to refer to members of a natural kind there must be 
psychophysical laws relating mental states to physical 
states; for to be members of a genuine natural kind mental 
states must have real essences, and those can only be 
physical states. (McGinn 1991: 127.) More schematically, 
for it to be true that a mental state ψ (a propositional 
attitude or a sensation) has a physical real essence ϕ it 
must be the case that a creature cannot instantiate ψ 
without thereby instantiating ϕ and vice versa. But McGinn, 
who follows Kripke on this issue, holds it conceivable that 
instances of ϕ and ψ can come apart, therefore the 
physical state ϕ cannot, ‘as a real essence must, 
determine the existence and identity conditions for ψ’, and 
therefore mental terms do not denote ‘physically 
circumscribable natural kinds’. (McGinn 1991: 127-8.)  
Now intuitions of conceivability are notoriously 
unreliable. So McGinn argues that the modal intuition is 
based on the more reliable claim of the multiple-
realizability of the mental by the physical (hereafter MR). It 
is MR which establishes the lack of psychophysical laws 
and hence prevents the instantiation of psychological 
natural kinds. He supports MR further by claiming that it 
only requires reflection on our common sense psychology 
to appreciate that mental states have no empirical depth. 
Hence reference to mental states is not constituted via 
implicit reference to kinds of intrinsic physical states but by 
reference to behaviourial regularities and introspection. In 
other words, mental terms refer to members of nominal 
kinds. (McGinn 1991: 146-52. A comparison with Dennett’s 
instrumentalist view is worth drawing here.) 
One might be just as wary of intuitions of MR as 
one is of intuitions of conceivability. (See Bechtel & 
Mundale 1997.) But suppose, for the sake of present 
purposes, we accept both MR and its use as a defence of 
the view that there are no psychophysical laws. Does this 
mean that we must draw the conclusion that there are no 
psychological natural kinds? Fodor draws the opposite 
conclusion: there are both physical natural kinds and 
independent psychological natural kinds. Distinct 
psychological and physical natural kinds are evidence for 
Fodor of the fact that the world is divided up in different 
ways: ‘not all the kinds (not all the classes of things and 
events about which there are important, counterfactual 
supporting generalizations to make) are, or correspond to, 
physical kinds’. (Fodor 1981: 144.) Fodor’s argument is 
intended to explicate the purpose of science: it is not to 
‘find some natural kind of physics coextensive with each 
kind predicate of the special science. It is, rather, to 
explicate the physical mechanisms whereby events 
conform to the laws of the special sciences’. (Fodor 1981: 
138.) 




So the controversy boils down to what the correct 
story is that we should be telling about mental predicates 
and psychological kinds. Instrumentalists (nominalists), like 
McGinn and Dennett, believe that mental predicates pick 
out nominal kinds. Realists, like Fodor, believe that mental 
predicates pick out genuine psychological natural kinds. 
According to a popular view in cognitive science these 
psychological natural kinds involve 
functional/representational states. They are constituted by 
physical states, but only in virtue of those particular causal 
properties of the physical states that determine the 
relevant psychological kind. The advocate of psychological 
natural kinds must navigate a fine line. On the one hand, 
mental states cannot be related to all the causal properties 
of the physical states, otherwise the mental states would 
be reducible to physical states; in other words, if McGinn 
were right that psychological kinds have to be physically 
circumscribable we would have little reason for thinking of 
them as distinctively psychological natural kinds. (See also 
Kim 1993: since kinds are determined by their causal 
properties and the causal properties of putative 
psychological kinds belong to their underlying physical 
features, psychological kinds will be concomitantly diverse, 
viz. not proper kinds; MR, rather than implying the 
autonomy of psychology, undermines it.) On the other 
hand, mental states cannot be related too loosely to the 
causal properties of physical states, i.e. not just anything 
can realize a psychological state, for then they would 
amount to merely nominal kinds. In short, different 
realizations of mental states must have just the right 
causal powers. 
There are no grounds to rule out the psychological 
natural kind account per impossibile. Constrained as 
mental states must be both by related mental states and 
by inputs from and outputs to the environment, they may 
have the appropriate causal properties. We just do not 
know at the moment what the right view about the 
reference of psychological terms is. The crucial point from 
the preceding is that realism about psychological kinds, 
pace McGinn, is an empirical hypothesis which only a 
completed cognitive science will be able to vindicate (or 
otherwise). 
 
3 Suppose mental states do not belong to natural 
kinds. Perhaps persons are nevertheless members of a 
natural kind. Or suppose mental states do belong to 
natural kinds. Perhaps persons do not. 
I can think of no reason why either of these options 
is appealing. If persons are natural kinds yet their main 
constitutive features are not, one would have to produce 
an alternative criterion of personhood, which seems prima 
facie implausible. And, if mental states are natural kinds, 
there seems no reason why, if persons are just ‘individuals 
sufficiently endowed with mental traits’, then what one 
concludes about mental traits should not be transmitted to 
persons 
As mentioned previously Dennett’s view has 
affinities with that of McGinn. Dennett has detailed how 
richly an individual has to be endowed with mental traits to 
count as a person. He counts six necessary conditions for 
personhood: 
(1) Stance dependence 
(2) Rationality 
(3) Intentionality 
(4) The capacity to reciprocate 
(5) Verbal communication 
(6) Self-consciousness 
(1) – (3) are mutually dependent. According to the 
intentional stance view Dennett advocates, individuals are 
to be regarded as systems, whose behaviour, in order to 
be predicted and explained, is assumed to be fully rational, 
and then predicated beliefs and desires (intentional 
states). Although Dennett believes that beliefs and desires 
are only posited once the appropriate stance is taken to an 
individual, beliefs and desires are nevertheless objective 
(i.e. reliable posits) once the appropriate stance has been 
taken. 
(1) – (3) are not sufficient conditions for 
personhood. Persons belong to that class of intentional 
systems that also display (4) – (6). The ‘higher features’ 
are dependent on the ‘lower features’. Persons necessarily 
reciprocate the intentional stance taken towards them. 
That is to say, persons are second-order intentional 
systems: they believe, desire, etc. that others believe, 
desire, etc.. Furthermore, persons necessarily 
communicate with each other. Adopting a Gricean 
intentional account of language, persons can be said to be 
third-order intentional systems: they intend that others 
believe that they intend a piece of behaviour to produce a 
specific response. Finally, persons are necessarily 
selfconscious: they have the ability to examine their own 
beliefs and desires. 
I only have a quarrel with (1). I think that a realist 
interpretation of personhood remains an option. (Some 
may conclude from the appearance above of the concept 
of a person as a cluster concept – or at least not a 
primitive concept – that it cannot be a natural kind concept. 
I conclude rather that the interlocking nature of the 
conditions is more suggestive of membership of a natural 
kind than a merely nominal kind.) Dennett, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, concludes that (1) – (6), although 
necessary, are not jointly sufficient. Why does he conclude 
this? It is because (1) – (3) introduce normative 
presuppositions. None of us actually fulfil them. Individuals 
can only ever aspire to the ideal of full rationality. If (1) – 
(6) were sufficient conditions for personhood then ‘they 
would not ensure that any actual entity was a person, for 
nothing would ever fulfil them’. (Dennett 1978: 285.) So we 
cannot set a standard for personhood that is not arbitrary; 
to emphasize: persons are not natural kinds but nominal 
kinds. But it is just not clear that we do need to presuppose 
an ideal standard of rationality. Perhaps certain organisms 
do fulfil (2) – (6) because they have sufficient rationality, 
i.e. they actually have beliefs and desires related to each 
other in such a way as to ground rationality. On such a 
view (2) – (6) would provide both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for personhood. I acknowledge that there may 
be borderline cases for which we would not know whether 
to ascribe personhood, but the problem of vagueness is 
associated with many putative natural kinds, not just 
persons. 
 
4 There are two questions that one might address 
concerning the concept of a person. Firstly, one might 
address the question of what criteria are to be used to 
distinguish persons from other types of things. Secondly, 
one might address the question of what it is that 
distinguishes one person from another person. The second 
question might be considered prior to the first question in 
so far as it might be argued that the concept of a person is 
such that only by addressing the issue of what 
distinguishes one person from another person can one 
fully understand what distinguishes a person from other 
kinds of thing. I think this may have matters the wrong way 
round.  




Considering persons as nominal kinds would 
supply a motivation for standard debates concerning the 
individuation of persons, e.g. in terms of psychological 
connectedness: we have to turn to our own intuitions about 
what should count as the same subject of consciousness. 
But if persons do turn out to be members of a natural kind, 
in virtue of sufficient psychological conditions such as 
those outlined above and realized by physical states 
having the relevant causal properties, then we might do 
well to look to cognitive science rather than to our intuitions 
about the mental for whether some entity qualifies as being 
a person (or otherwise). 
 
I am grateful to Brian Garvey for suggestions 
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